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aBstract
This article will focus on witness anonymity as a tool to encourage the 
reporting of criminal activities and criminal victimisation by victims and 
other witnesses, and as a mechanism to ensure that witnesses in criminal 
proceedings are duly protected. This will be juxtaposed against an accused’s 
right to a fair trial, in terms of s 35(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 and relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act,1 
as well as the foundational principle of the criminal justice system that an 
accused has a right to confront witnesses testifying against him or her and 
that such testimony should be given in an open court and in the presence 
of the accused. Arguments in favour of witness anonymity, primarily based 
on the contention that the right of confrontation is not absolute, will be 
considered together with examples from other jurisdictions and arguments 
asserting that the curtailing of the right of confrontation to accommodate 
true witness anonymity are too extreme and inconceivable in terms of an 
accused’s right to a fair trial.
1.  Introduction
Statistics confirm that all South Africans – irrespective of their sex, 
race, financial status or social standing – experience some form of 
criminal victimisation.2 Those most vulnerable, like the poor and un-
employed, as well as children and the youth, experience and witness 
exceptionally high levels of criminal victimisation.3 However, with the 
first national victimisation survey conducted in 1998 it already became 
apparent that only 50% of all crimes were reported to the South African 
Police Service. The comparable 2003 National Survey noted increased 
reporting rates, but only with regard to certain types of crimes, and 
* BA LLB LLD (Stell), Lecturer, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminal Procedure, 
University of the Western Cape.
1 Sections 152, 153, 154, 158 – 167 & 170A–173 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 
1977.
2 For the SAPS Crime Statistics for the period April 2008 – March 2009 visit, available 
at http://www.saps.gov.za/statistics/reports/crimestats/2009/crime_stats.htm, accessed 
25 November 2009. 
3 C Frank Victimisation in South Africa and the needs of crime victims Monograph 137, 
July 2007 Institute for Security Studies, available at http://www.iss.co.za/static/tem-
plates/tmpl_html.php?node_id=2960&slink_id=5488&slink_type=12&link_id=4059, 
accessed 25 November 2009. 
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the National Youth Victimisation Survey from 2005/2006 indicated that 
only one out of every ten respondents reported cases of assault to the 
police.4
One of the reasons for these poor reporting rates of crimes and 
criminal victimisation in South Africa can be attributed to the fear 
that witnesses have for offenders, the fear of harassment, intimidation 
and other consequences that may result from their decision to report 
crime and which may, with regard to whistleblowers, also include loss 
of employment.5 It is furthermore said that the experience of such 
secondary victimisation or intimidation will not only reduce the likeli-
hood that citizens will engage with the criminal justice system about 
the particular crime in question, but also with regard to other criminal 
events in future.6
This article will focus on witness anonymity not only as a tool to 
encourage the report of criminal activities and criminal victimisation 
by victims and other witnesses, but also as a mechanism to ensure 
that witnesses in criminal proceedings are duly protected. This will 
be juxtaposed against an accused’s right to a fair trial, in terms of 
s 35(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and 
relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act,7 as well as the 
foundational principle of the criminal justice system that an accused 
has a right to confront witnesses testifying against him or her and that 
such testimony should be given in an open court and in the presence 
of the said accused.
It must be noted that this article will focus exclusively on witness 
anonymity as a means of protection for victim-witnesses and other 
witnesses. Although reference will be made to other special legisla-
tive measures of protection – such as the use of intermediaries,8 as 
4 Ibid. 
5 It should be noted that repeat victimization is not the same as intimidation, although 
the same offenders may be responsible for both and the same witness/victim may 
be both re-victimised as well as intimidated. In witness intimidation the intent is to 
discourage the victim from reporting a crime or cooperating with the prosecution. In 
repeat victimization, however, the motive is acquisitive. K Dedel ‘Problem-orientated 
Witness Intimidation in Guides for Police, Problem-Specific Guide Series’, Guide No 
42 (July 2006), available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/6626586/Witness-Intimida-
tion, accessed on 30 November 2009; J Irish, W Magadhla, K Qhobosheane, & G 
Newham Testifying Without Fear: A Report on Witness Management and the National 
Witness Protection Programme in South Africa Research report written for the Centre 
for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, October 2000 (see J Irish, W Magadhla, 
K Qhobosheane & G Newham at http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/policing/testyingwit-
houtfear.pdf, accessed 6 October 2010); S v Staggie & Another 2003(1) SACR 232 (C).
6 Dedel op cit (n5) 6.
7 Sections 152, 153, 154, 158 – 167 & 170A – 173 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 
1977.
8 Section 170A.
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well as the use of closed circuit television and other electronic media,9 
– these alternative measures will not be dealt with in depth.
2.  Witness anonymity defined
Witness anonymity in its most extreme form refers to witnesses who 
provide testimony in criminal proceedings without being seen, heard 
or identified by the accused (and his/her legal representative(s)) or 
anybody else in the public arena of the court room. While a limited 
number of jurisdictions do make provision for such true or complete 
witness anonymity in criminal matters (see section three below), in 
South African law, no provision for complete witness anonymity is 
made. In fact, the right to confront witnesses and accusers is explicitly 
provided for in sections 152 and 158(1) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act,10 where it is required that accused persons are present at their 
trial and that such a trial be conducted in an open court. Emphasis is 
furthermore placed on the viva voce testimony of witnesses in (espe-
cially) criminal matters.
However, some exceptions to this foundational principle of confron-
tation in the South African criminal justice system have crystallised 
over time. For example, in s 153(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act the 
legislator makes specific provision for situations where the likelihood 
exists that harm may result to a person, other than the accused, who 
testifies in a criminal matter. In such instances the court has the discre-
tion to direct that the witness testifies behind closed doors and that 
no person shall be present when such evidence is given unless his/
her presence is necessary in connection with the proceedings or is 
authorized by the court.11 The court may also direct that the identity 
of such a witness not be revealed or that it shall not be revealed for 
a period specified by the court.12 Section 153(2) does not, however, 
make provision for complete witness anonymity in the sense that no 
person, not even the accused and legal representatives in a particular 
case, know the identity of the witness.
Other provisions aimed at the protection of the identity of a witness 
in South African law include s 153(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 
which allows for criminal proceedings to take place behind closed 
doors if it is in the interests of the security of the State, of good order, 
of public morals or of the administration of justice. Moreover, a court 
may direct that no information relating to such proceedings, or any 
part thereof, held behind closed doors shall be published in any 
9 Section 158(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
10 Act 51 of 1977. 
11 For example: S v Manqina & Others 1994 (2) SACR 692 (C). 
12 Section 153(2)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
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manner whatsoever.13 This includes information which may reveal the 
identity of a particular protected witness.14 Sections 158(2)(a) and 
(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act,15 that allow a court to – on its 
own initiative, on application by the public prosecutor, accused or a 
witness – order that a witness or an accused, if the witness or accused 
consents thereto, give evidence by means of closed circuit television or 
similar electronic media if it will prevent the likelihood that prejudice 
or harm might result to any person if he or she testifies or is present at 
such proceedings.16 The right of an accused person to cross-examine 
witnesses and confront people testifying against him/her is however 
still protected as subsec (4) of s 158 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
provides that the prosecutor and the accused (or his/her legal rep-
resentative) have the right, by means of the closed circuit television 
or other electronic media, to question the witness and to observe the 
reaction of that witness.
With regard to parties involved in matters of a sexual nature and 
for persons under the age of 18 years, special provision is made in 
ss 153(3) and 153(4) – (6) of the Act respectively. With regard to matters 
of a sexual nature it is directed that in cases where it is alleged that 
the accused committed or attempted to commit any offence as contem-
plated in s 1 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act 2007, or any act for the purpose of furthering the com-
mission of such a sexual offence, or extortion or any statutory offence 
of demanding from any other person some advantage which was not 
due and, by inspiring fear in the mind of such a person, compelling 
the person to render an advantage; the court may hold that any person 
whose presence is not necessary at the proceedings or any persons or 
class of persons mentioned in the request, shall not be present at the 
proceedings. Furthermore, in such cases judgment shall be delivered 
and sentence passed in an open court only if the court is of the opinion 
that the identity of the said person would not be revealed thereby. Also, 
any person whose presence is not necessary at criminal proceedings 
in these instances shall not be admitted at such proceedings while 
the protected individual referred to in these particular subsections is 
giving evidence, unless the protected individual or his/her parent or 
guardian (if the person is a minor) requests otherwise.
And, with regard to minors, children under the age of 18 years, 
the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 permits only the child, the probation 
officer and the child’s parents or an appropriate adult or guardian to 
13 Section 154(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
14 Section 154(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
15 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
16 Section 158(2)(e) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977; For example:. S v Domingo 
2005 (1) SACR 193 (C), S v M 2004(1) SACR 238 (N).
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be present at a preliminary enquiry.17 The presiding officer at such a 
preliminary enquiry may exclude any such person mentioned from 
attending the inquiry if that person’s presence is not in the best in-
terest of the child or if it undermines the inquisitorial objectives of 
the preliminary inquiry.18 A further example of an initiative to protect 
witnesses is the Witness Protection Programme of the NPA (National 
Prosecuting Authority), as regulated19 by the Witness Protection Act.20 
This programme is intended to deal only with a small number of the 
most extreme cases of witness intimidation and the threat of harm.21 
It primarily provides protection to witnesses/victims until the case is 
completed in court, while relocation of such witnesses/victims and the 
remoulding of their identity, is in actuality an extremely unusual and 
rare occurrence.22 The Witness Protection Programme is furthermore 
also not without its own problems, regarding effectiveness, security 
and the willingness of witnesses to participate.23
The final exception in the Criminal Procedure Act,24 to the fun-
damental right of confrontation is found in s 170A of the Act. This 
provision allows for the appointment of an intermediary in order to 
enable a witness, who is under the biological or mental age of eighteen 
years, and who would suffer undue mental stress or suffering if he/
she would testify, to provide evidence through that duly appointed 
intermediary.25 No examination, cross-examination or re-examination 
of such a witness make take place other than through the appointed 
intermediary, and such an intermediary may convey the general 
purport of any question to the relevant witness.26 Subsection (7) of 
the provision also requires a court to provide reasons for refusing any 
application or request by the public prosecutor for the appointment of 
17 Section 44 of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008. 
18 Sections 44(3) and 44(4)(a) and (b) of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008. 
19 Section 185A of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, dealt with this issue prior to 
its repeal by the Witness Protection Act 112 of 1998.
20 Witness Protection Act 112 of 1998 (It only became operational in March 2000 due to 
budgetary constraints.)
21 D Bruce ‘Danger, threats, or just fear: Witness intimidation in three Gauteng courts’ 
(September 2005) 13 SA Crime Quarterly 23; HB Kruger & H Oosthuizen ‘Die Wet op 
Getuiebeskerming 112 of 1998: Enkele aspekte oor die praktiese werking daarvan’ 
(2001) 26 (3) Tydskrif vir die Regswetenskap 78ff.
22 Bruce op cit (n21) 23; A Minnaar ‘Witness Protection Programmes – Some lessons 
from the South African experience’ (2002) 15(3) Acta Criminologica 122. 
23 Minnaar op cit (n22) 128; S v Staggie & Another supra (n5).
24 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
25 Section 170A(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977; S v Booi and Another 2005 
(1) SACR 599 (B); S v Manqaba 2005 (2) SACR 489 (W); S v T 2000 (2) SACR 658 
(Ck); S v Stefaans 1999 (1) SACR 182 (C); K v The Regionial Court Magistrate NO and 
Others 1996(1) SACR 434 (E); S v Mathebula 1996 (2) SACR 231 (T).
26 Section 170A(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
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an intermediary in respect of child complainants below the age of 14 
years immediately upon refusal, and such reasons shall be entered into 
the record of the proceedings.
Irrespective of these limited exceptions to the foundational princi-
ple of confrontation in the South African criminal justice system, no 
provision for complete witness anonymity is made. In this article the 
concept of complete witness anonymity as provided for in the criminal 
justice systems of other jurisdictions (specifically the United Kingdom 
(UK), Queensland, Australia and New Zealand) will be considered and 
discussed. This notion of complete witness anonymity will then be jux-
taposed against the more stringent approach followed by South African 
courts with regard to the curtailment of the right to confrontation in 
order to determine whether complete witness anonymity has a place 
in our constitutional dispensation.
3.  Witness anonymity in the United Kingdom, Queensland, 
Australia and New Zealand
The UK Criminal Evidence Witness Anonymity Act of 2008 makes 
provision for witness anonymity in criminal proceedings and s 2 of 
the Act lists the types of measures that may be required to secure the 
anonymity of a particular witness. It includes:
•	 that the witness’s name and other identifying details be withheld or 
removed from materials disclosed to any party in the proceedings;27
•	 that the witness may use a pseudonym;28
•	 that the witness is not asked questions of any specified description 
that might lead to the identification of the witness;29
•	 that the witness is screened to any specified extent;30 and
•	 that the witness’s voice is subjected to modulation to any specified 
extent.31
Queensland, Australia in the Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Amend-
ment Act 57 of 2000 also gives effect to the needs of particular wit-
nesses to not have their identity disclosed.32 However, the protection 
27 Section 2(a)(i) and (ii) of the UK Criminal Evidence Witness Anonymity Act of 2008.
28 Section 2(b) of the UK Criminal Evidence Witness Anonymity Act of 2008.
29 Section 2(c) of the UK Criminal Evidence Witness Anonymity Act of 2008.
30 Section 2(d) of the UK Criminal Evidence Witness Anonymity Act of 2008.
31 Section 2(e) of the UK Criminal Evidence Witness Anonymity Act of 2008; Also see 
R v Davis [2008] 2 Cr. App. R. 33; The Criminal Evidence Witness Anonymity Act of 
2008 was enacted and received Royal Assent on 21 July 2008 as a direct response to 
the judgment of the House of Lords in R v Davis on 18 June 2008. 
32 Assented to on 17 November 2000; For a comprehensive discussion on witness ano-
nymity in Australia see: D Lusty ‘Anonymous accusers: An historical and comparative 
analysis of secret witnesses in criminal trials’ (2002) 24 Sydney Law Review 361 – 426.
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afforded by this Act is only available to persons who are or were 
involved in a controlled operation conducted by a law enforcement 
agency for the purposes of investigating criminal activities.33 In New 
Zealand, s 13A of the Evidence Act 56 of 1908 (introduced in 1986) 
mirrored the provisions of the Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Amend-
ment Act 57 of 2000 of Queensland, Australia, and it was also only 
available to police officers and other undercover agents.34 However, 
in 1997 with the Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Amendment Act 103 
of 1997, the protection of anonymity was extended to all witnesses if 
their lives were likely to be endangered.35
In these jurisdictions, where true witness anonymity is permitted, 
the opportunity to testify anonymously is not however, a blanket 
right available to all witnesses. The UK Criminal Evidence Witness 
Anonymity Act of 2008 lists three conditions that must be met before 
an anonymity order may be granted. (It is important to note that all 
three of these conditions must be satisfied before a court will grant an 
anonymity order.)
•	 Condition A requires that the measures to be specified in the order 
are necessary in order to protect the safety of the witness or another 
person or to prevent any serious damage to the property,36 or in 
order to prevent real harm to the public interest (whether affecting 
the carrying on of any activities in the public interest or the safety 
of a person involved in carrying on such activities).37
•	 Condition B requires that after having had regard to all the circum-
stances of the particular case, the taking of these measures as de-
scribed in s 2 of the Act would be consistent with the defendant re-
ceiving a fair trial.38
•	 Condition C requires that the order is necessary to make in the inter-
ests of justice and by reason of the fact that it appears to the court 
that it is important that the witness should testify,39 and the witness 
would not testify if the order were not made.40
33 Section 21D of the Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Amendment Act 57 of 2000.
34 Law Commission of India’s Consultation Paper on Witness Protection 13 August 2004 
at 9, available at http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/Summary%20of%20the%20
Consultation%20paper%20on%20Witness%20protection%20AND%20Questionnaire.
pdf, accessed on 21 October 2010. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Section 4(3)(a) and s 4(6) of the UK Criminal Evidence Witness Anonymity Act of 
2008.
37 Section 4(3)(b) of the UK Criminal Evidence Witness Anonymity Act of 2008.
38 Section 4(4) of the UK Criminal Evidence Witness Anonymity Act of 2008.
39 Section 4(5)(a) of the UK Criminal Evidence Witness Anonymity Act of 2008. 
40 Section 4(5)(b) of the UK Criminal Evidence Witness Anonymity Act of 2008.
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And, s 5(2) of the Act lists the considerations which the court must 
have regard to when deciding whether conditions A – C in s 4 of the 
Act were met. The considerations include:
•	 the general right of a defendant in criminal proceedings to know the 
identity of a witness in the proceedings;41
•	 the extent to which the credibility of the witness concerned would 
be a relevant factor when the weight of his or her evidence comes 
to be assessed;42
•	 whether evidence given by the witness might be the sole or decisive 
evidence implicating the defendant;43
•	 whether the witness’s evidence could be properly tested (whether 
on grounds of credibility or otherwise) without his or her identity 
being disclosed;44
•	 whether there is any reason to believe that the witness (i) has a ten-
dency to be dishonest, or (ii) has any motive to be dishonest in the 
circumstances of the case, having regard (in particular) to any pre-
vious convictions of the witness and to any relationship between 
the witness and the defendant or any associates of the defendant;45
•	 whether it would be reasonably practicable to protect the witness’s 
identity by any means other than by making a witness anonymity 
order specifying the measures that are under consideration by the 
court.46
In the most recent version of the New Zealand Act, the Evidence Act 
69 of 2006, s 112 now regulates witness anonymity in High Court 
proceedings. In an application for a witness’s anonymity by either the 
accused or the prosecution, the court must be satisfied that: the safety 
of the witness or, of any other person, is likely to be endangered, or 
that there is a likelihood of serious damage to property, if the wit-
ness’s identity is disclosed.47 Further, that there is either no reason 
to believe that the witness has a motive or tendency to be dishonest, 
having regard (where applicable) to the witness’s previous convictions 
or the witness’s relationship with the accused or any associates of the 
accused, or the witness’s credibility can be tested properly without dis-
closure of the witness’s identity.48 And finally, that the making of such 
41 Section 5(2)(a) of the UK Criminal Evidence Witness Anonymity Act of 2008.
42 Section 5(2)(b) of the UK Criminal Evidence Witness Anonymity Act of 2008.
43 Section 5(2)(c) of the UK Criminal Evidence Witness Anonymity Act of 2008.
44 Section 5(2)(d) of the UK Criminal Evidence Witness Anonymity Act of 2008.
45 Section 5(2)(e) of the UK Criminal Evidence Witness Anonymity Act of 2008.
46 Section 5(2)(f) of the UK Criminal Evidence Witness Anonymity Act of 2008.
47 Section 112(4)(a) of the Evidence Act 69 of 2006.
48 Section 112(4)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Evidence Act 69 of 2006.
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an order granting witness anonymity would not deprive the accused 
of a fair trial.49
In addition, six guiding factors, which the court must have regard 
to when considering an application for witness anonymity, are listed 
in s 112(5) of the Act. The court must take into consideration, the 
general right of a defendant to know the identity of witnesses,50 the 
principle that witness anonymity orders are justified only in excep-
tional circumstances,51 the gravity of the offence the accused is being 
charged with,52 the importance of the witness’s evidence to the case 
of the party who wishes to call that witness,53 whether it is practical 
for the witness to be protected by any means other than an anonymity 
order,54 and whether there is other evidence that corroborates the 
witness’s evidence.55 However, it is also expressly stated in s 112(5) 
that the consideration of these factors may not limit the working and 
effect of s 112(4).
But, is such complete witness anonymity really necessary and is it 
justifiable in terms of the deep-rooted right to confrontation inherent 
to the accusatorial system?
4.  The right of confrontation and the South African criminal 
justice system
The antiquity of the foundational right of confrontation dates back to 
around 80 – 90 A.C.56 It is said that the right originated in Roman Law 
and further developed among three main lines: First, legislation of the 
Emperor Justinian in the year 539 provided the normative foundation of 
the right of witness confrontation. This norm was derived from custom 
and practice and was based on the necessity of accurate fact finding in 
criminal cases. Second, Pope Gregory I emphasised the guarantee of 
fundamentally fair procedures to all accused persons and finally, the 
49 Section 112(4)(c) of the Evidence Act 69 of 2006. 
50 Section 112(5)(a) of the Evidence Act 69 of 2006.
51 Section 112(5)(b) of the Evidence Act 69 of 2006.
52 Section 112(5)(c) of the Evidence Act 69 of 2006.
53 Section 112(5)(d) of the Evidence Act 69 of 2006.
54 Section 112(5)(e) of the Evidence Act 69 of 2006.
55 Section 112(5)(f) of the Evidence Act 69 of 2006. 
56 In the Acts of the Apostles (Acts) 25:16 the Roman Governor Festus, discussing the 
proper treatment of his prisoner, Paul, stated: ‘It is not the manner of the Romans 
to deliver any man up to die before the accused has met his accusers face to face, 
and has been given a chance to defend himself against the charges.’; FR Herrmann & 
BM Speer ‘Facing the Accuser: Ancient and Medieval Precursors of the Confrontation 
Clause’ (1993-1994) 34 Virginia Journal of International Law 481; R v Davis supra 
(n31).
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great pseudoisidorean forgeries57 of the mid-ninth century utilised it as 
a powerful defence tool to ward off unfair accusations and unreliable 
testimony.58 The Roman criminal procedure, like that of South Africa, 
was accusatorial in nature.59 
In an accusatorial system, the right of confrontation is regarded as 
a foundational principle of the criminal procedure. The accusatorial 
system presupposes a ‘day in court’, thereby requiring a public pro-
ceeding in the presence of the accused,60 that witnesses give their 
testimony orally (also in the presence of the accused), and that the 
accused (or his/her legal representative) be allowed to cross-examine 
witnesses.61 This principle of open justice is based on the notion of a 
fair trial and the consideration of publicity; that members of the public 
are entitled to information.62 An essential element of the accusatorial 
proceedings is consequently that witnesses be subjected to examination-
in-chief and cross-examination during the public trial.63 The purpose 
of cross-examination in this context is to elicit information from the 
witness favourable to one’s own case, and also to cast doubt upon the 
evidence provided by the witness during examination-in-chief.64 It is 
a fundamental belief in accusatorial systems that these ‘tools’ assist in 
the discovering of truth and the assessment of credibility.65
However, it is also evident that testifying in an accusatorial environ-
ment can be an extremely traumatic and stressful experience for victims 
and witnesses alike. Witnesses are required to testify in the presence 
of the accused, as well as a group of people, previously unknown to 
them. Such testimony may often be very personal and/or embarrassing. 
Cross-examination can furthermore be hostile in nature, and especially 
intimidating in the setting of a courtroom. The court environment itself, 
the procedure being followed and the language used are additional 
57 In the mid-ninth century, a group of clerics undertook to forge legal texts. Their 
product was a massive collection of legal opinion ascribed to an early pope, Isidorus 
Mercator. Herrmann & Speer op cit (n56) at 503.
58 Herrmann & Speer op cit (n56) 483 – 484; Lusty op cit (n32) 363.
59 Herrmann & Speer op cit (n56) 484.
60 Section 35(3)(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
61 K Müller ‘The effect of the accusatorial system on the child witness’ (2002) 1(2) 
CARSA 13; Lusty op cit (n32) 361.
62 S v Geiges & Others (M & G Media Ltd and others intervening) 2007 (2) SACR 507 (T) 
paragraphs [52] – [61] at 519c – 522j.
63 Müller op cit (n61) 14.
64 Müller op cit (n61) 14; Klink v Regional Court Magistrate NO and Others 1996 (3) 
BCLR 402 (SE).
65 Müller op cit (n61) 14.
360 SACJ . (2010) 3
SACJ-2010-3-Text.indd   360 2011/02/14   2:48 PM
features of the accusatorial system that may be disconcerting to victims 
and witnesses.66
Thus, the negative (and sometimes unfair) impact of the rules of 
an accusatorial criminal procedure system on witnesses and victims 
has also been recognised and addressed (to a certain extent) by al-
lowing for exceptions to the foundational principle of the right of 
confrontation. In S v Staggie and another,67 it was held that the right 
to a public trial was a fundamental part of the legal system, but that 
it did not mean that there were no exceptions to the general rule.68 
In 1989, the South African Law Commission (now the Law Reform 
Commission) concluded that the accusatorial system, with its strong 
emphasis on cross-examination was insensitive and unfair to child 
witnesses.69 Specific provisions in the Criminal Procedure Act,70 now 
make provision for a departure from the strict right of confrontation 
in particular situations. (These provisions were discussed in section 
2 of the article.) The court in K v The Regional Court Magistrate 
NO and others,71 held that although vital, the right to cross-examine 
witnesses was not an absolute right. And, whether the curtailment or 
limitation of cross-examination resulted in the negation of a right to 
a fair trial, depended upon the circumstances of the particular case.72 
Such exceptions to the right of confrontation in the South African 
criminal justice system have been explained and justified in terms 
of the balancing of the rights of an accused against the rights of a 
victim/witness.73
In the case of Maryland v Craig,74 the USA Supreme Court described 
the right guaranteed by the confrontation clause,75 in terms of the 
following four elements:
•	 the physical examination of the witness,
•	 observation of the witness,
66 Müller op cit (n61) 13; Bruce op cit (n21) 24. J Simon ‘Pre-recorded videotaped evi-
dence of child witnesses’ (2006) 1 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 59; S v 
Staggie & another supra (n5). 
67 S v Staggie & another supra (n5).
68 S v Staggie & another supra (n5) at 243g.
69 Simon op cit (n66) 57.
70 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977; See ss153(1)-(6), 154, 158 & 170A. 
71 K v The Regionial Court Magistrate NO and others supra (n25). 
72 K v The Regionial Court Magistrate NO and others supra (n25) at 436; Lusty op cit 
(n32) 362; S v Staggie & another supra (n5). 
73 Klink v Regional Magistrate NO supra (n64); Simon op cit (n66) 72; S v Staggie & ano-
ther supra (n5) at 249a – b; R v Davis supra (n31). 
74 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990); Law Commission of India’s Consultation paper 
on Witness Protection op cit (n34).
75 Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America.
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•	 the insurance that the witness will give his/her testimony under 
oath – thereby impressing the seriousness of the matter upon the 
witness and guarding against the possibility of a lie,
•	 the submission of the witness to cross-examination and the provi-
sion of an opportunity to observe the witness’s demeanour, thus 
aiding in the assessment of the witness’s credibility.76
The combined effect of these four elements serves the right of the 
accused to confront his/her witnesses. This right can therefore be 
described as a functional mechanism aimed at promoting reliability 
in criminal matters and the advancement of a practical concern for 
the accuracy of the truth-determining process.77 The value of face-
to-face confrontation, for example, was found to reduce the risk of 
a witness to wrongfully implicate an innocent person.78 The court 
also recognised the strong symbolic purpose being served by requiring 
that a witness testify in the presence of the accused.79 Nevertheless, 
while it is evident that face-to-face confrontation forms the core of the 
foundational principle of a right to a fair trial and the right to confront 
witnesses, it can definitely not be regarded as the sine qua non of the 
confrontation right.80 As, in some instances, a face-to-face confronta-
tion might actually cause significant emotional distress for a witness 
and the confrontation will then, in fact, rather disserve the confronta-
tion clause’s truth-seeking goal.81 The court consequently concluded 
that there exists no absolute right to have a face-to-face confrontation 
between the accused and the witness.82 The USA confrontation clause 
rather reflects a preference that must occasionally give way to consid-
erations of public policy and the necessities of the case.83 Although 
the victim-witnesses in the Maryland case were children, who suffered 
76 Maryland v. Craig supra (n74) at 845 – 848; Also see California v. Green, 399 U.S. 
149, 157 (1970). 
77 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986); 
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
684-685 (1984); Lusty op cit (n32) 362.
78 Maryland v. Craig supra (n74) at 847.
79 Maryland v. Craig supra (n28) at 848.
80 California v. Green supra (n30); Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985).
81 Maryland v. Craig supra (n74) at 870.
82 The court also said, however, that although this right is not absolute, it will not be 
easily dispensed with. Maryland v. Craig supra (n74) at 850 – 851; R Bloe ‘Maryland 
v Craig: The Court’s use as evidence of videotaped testimony of a child who has been 
sexually abused is declared not to violate a criminal defendant’s sixth amendment 
rights to confront his accuser’ (1991) 19 Southern University Law Review 285.
83 Maryland v. Craig supra (n74) at 849 – 850; Also see Mattox v United States 156 
US237 (1895); Not all states in the USA have adopted this fluid approach to the right 
of confrontation, see T Cusick ‘Televised justice: Toward a new definition of confron-
tation under Maryland v Craig’ (1990-1991) 40 Catholic University Law Review 967 
– 1000.
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sexual abuse, the exception was later also extended to an adult male 
robbery victim to testify by closed-circuit television.84
But, when will these exceptions to the right of confrontation be 
allowed? How will it be validated? And, can the special vulnerability 
of a witness/victim be presumed, or must it be proved? In the case of 
DPP, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
& others,85 the use of intermediaries in terms of s 170A of the Crimi-
nal Procedure Act,86 and with specific regard to child witnesses and 
victims were considered. Here it was held that in every case where 
a child was to provide testimony, the presiding judge – out of his/
her own accord if the matter was not raised by the prosecution – had 
to consider the possible vulnerability of the witness/victim and had 
to raise the possibility of using an intermediary to assist the child 
witness/victim in providing their testimony.87 It was furthermore held, 
that in order to exercise this discretion, the presiding officer should 
assess the individual needs, wishes and feelings of each child.88 With 
regard to proceedings in camera it was also held that each situation 
should be dealt with on its own merits, taking into consideration the 
nature of the evidence to be provided by the child witness/victim and 
the age of the child.89
Although this case dealt with child witnesses specifically and then 
also primarily with s 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act, the stance 
of the court with regard to these specific limitations of the right of 
confrontation can be viewed as a clear indication that the special 
vulnerabilities of a witness/victim in general need not necessarily 
be proved, and that exceptions to the foundational principle of con-
frontation may in certain situations even be recommended by a court 
and not only be considered in response to a request or application. 
Similarly, in S v Staggie & another,90 – dealing with a request that a 
victim give testimony in camera – the court held that s 158 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act,91 which allows for testimony to be provided 
by means of electronic media like a closed-circuit television, is couched 
in open-ended language and conferred a discretion on the court to 
84 Gilpin v McCormick 921 F.2d (9th Cir. 1990); Bloe op cit (n82) 289.
85 DPP, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & others 2009 
(2) SACR 130 (CC).
86 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
87 DPP, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & others supra 
(n85) at paras [113]–[114] at 173f–h; S v Dayimani 2006 (2) SACR 594 (E). 
88 DPP, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & others supra 
(n85) at para [123] at 176b.
89 DPP, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & others supra 
(n85) at paras [145] and [146] at 181h–i and 182b–c; S v M supra (n16).
90 S v Staggie & another supra (n5). 
91 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
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determine proceedings in the best interests of justice (and especially 
to protect witnesses) and that the discretion should not be restrictively 
construed.92
But, not all agree that such extension of the parameters of the right of 
confrontation should be allowed. For example, according to Steytler the 
right of confrontation essentially include ‘…the right to have the fullest 
opportunity of cross-examining meaningfully and effectively. Where 
the cross-examiner’s questions are substituted by another person and 
the examination does not take place within the physical presence of 
the examiner, there is a prima facie limitation of the right when given 
its broadest adversarial meaning.’93 And, in the USA, a Federal court 
refused to allow a four-year-old to use a closed circuit-television in 
order to testify and identify his father’s alleged murderer.94
5.  Curtailing the right to confrontation: How far is too far?
Very few jurisdictions make provision for true/complete witness ano-
nymity in criminal proceedings, and in those countries where provision 
are made for such anonymity very few examples from case law actually 
exist. There have been at least three cases in which anonymity orders 
were made in terms of the New Zealand Evidence (Witness Anonymity) 
Amendment Act 103 of 1997, but none of the witnesses actually testified 
anonymously at the trial.95 All three cases involved gang-related violence 
and the witnesses granted anonymity in each of the cases were innocent 
bystanders. In R v Dunnill,96 the order was ineffective as the identity of 
the witness became widely known even before the trial commenced. 
In The Queen v Michael James Curry,97 the accused pled guilty prior to 
the trial. And in The Queen v Lawrence Glen Atkins,98 a pre-trial appeal 
against the anonymity order led to the dismissal of the order.
Witness anonymity has also been the subject of discussion in a few 
cases and with relation to various types of witnesses and criminal of-
fences in India. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab,99 the Supreme Court 
92 S v Staggie & another supra (n5) at 248a and 250f – g. 
93 N Steytler Constitutional Criminal Procedure (1998) 348. In the American case of 
Douglas v Alabama 380 US 415 (1965), the court held that the primary interest of the 
confrontation clause in the Sixth Amendment is the right of cross-examination; Simon 
op cit (n66) 71.
94 Government of the Virgin Island v Riley 750 F. Supp. 727 (D. Virgin Islands 1990); 
Bloe op cit (82) 289.
95 Lusty op cit (n32) 401.
96 [1998] 2 NZLR 341; Lusty op cit (n32) 401.
97 [2000] NZCA 221 (28 September 2000); Lusty op cit (n32) 401.
98 [2000] NZCA 11 (9 February 2000); Lusty op cit (n32) 401.
99 (1994) 3 SCC 569; Also see People’s Union of Civil Liberties v. Union of India (2003) 
10 SCALE 967.
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held that the right of an accused to cross-examine the prosecution’s 
witnesses was not absolute, but was subject to exceptions. Sections 
16(2) and (3) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 
1987 (TADA), for example, provides a court with the discretion to keep 
the identity and address of a witness secret. Also, the maintenance of 
the anonymity of the victims of rape was emphasized and confirmed 
in Delhi Domestic Working Women’s Forum v Union of India,100 and 
State of Punjab v Gurmit Singh.101 In Sakshi v Union of India,102 the 
need for procedural safeguards, including the right to withhold a wit-
ness’s identity, and to protect the victim of child sexual abuse during 
the conduct of the trial was stressed. However, none of these cases 
provided guidelines on the manner in which the identity of a witness 
can be kept confidential either before or during the trial, and the con-
siderations to be taken into account when making such an order.103
In the English case of R v Davis,104 Lord Carswell held that it was 
possible to infer some propositions from the order made by the trial 
judge in the Davis case, as well as subsequent cases dealing with 
witness anonymity. He held that there should always be a presumption 
in favour of open justice and confrontation of a defendant by his/her 
accuser.105 And, while it is possible to allow departures from the basic 
rule of open justice to some extent, a clear case of necessity should 
first be made out.106 The court should always be sufficiently satisfied 
that the witness’s reluctance to give evidence in the ordinary manner 
is genuine and that the extent of his/her fear justifies a degree of 
anonymity. Many anonymising expedients furthermore exist, and the 
more of these expedients the court choose to adopt, the stronger the 
case must be for invading the principle of open justice.107 Another 
important consideration identified by Lord Carswell is the relative im-
portance of the witness’s testimony in the particular matter;
‘…if the testimony constitutes the sole or decisive evidence against the 
defendant, anonymising which prevents or unduly hinders the defendant 
and his advisers from taking steps to undermine the credit of the witness is 
100 (1995) 1 SCC 14. 
101 (1996) 2 SCC 384.
102 (2004) 6 SCALE 15. 
103 Also see Best Bakery Case (2004) 4 SCC 158; Neelam Katara v Union of India (judg-
ment dated 14-10-2003) and Bimal Kaur Khalsa AIR 1988 P&H 95; Law Commission 
of India’s Consultation paper on Witness Protection 13 August 2004 op cit (n34).
104 R v Davis supra (n31). 
105 R v Davis supra (n31) at para 59.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid; including withholding a witness’s name and personal details, screening of the 
witness from the accused and the public, screening of the accused from the accused 
legal representatives and disguising of the witnesses’ voice. 
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most likely to operate unfairly. It is a question of fact in any given case what, 
if any, measures would be compatible with sufficient fairness of the trial.’108
In the South African case of S v Nzama & Another,109 the notion that an 
accused not be informed of the identity of witnesses testifying against 
him was described as incomprehensible in terms of an accused’s right 
to a fair trial.110 In this case the prosecution applied for an order that 
one of the state’s witnesses be permitted to testify in ‘…such disguise 
as would preclude the accused, the court or anyone else from being 
aware of what he looked like and of his identity.’111 The court con-
ceded that s 153(2)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act does not accord 
power to the court to grant such an order, and further, that the notion 
was obscure to think that a court is to be expected to be able to judge 
the credibility of a witness if the court cannot see the witness’s features 
and the court cannot inform itself by observation of how the witness 
reacts to questions.112
Likewise, in S v Leepile & Others,113 it was held that although a 
witness, in appropriate circumstances, may be allowed to remain 
anonymous as far as persons other than those engaged in the case 
are concerned when a trial is heard in camera, the withholding of this 
information from the accused himself and his legal representatives was 
inconceivable.114 The court held that serious difficulties regarding the 
solution of a variety of legal questions could arise in such an instance. 
For example:
‘To what extent must defence counsel’s cross-examination be restricted in 
order to comply with the order? How much information may he be allowed 
to elicit from the witness regarding his birth, training, marital status, family, 
residence and general biographical detail before he runs the risk of infring-
ing the order? If counsel by chance should become aware of the witness’ true 
identity and this leads to the discovery of valuable information regarding the 
witness’ credibility, may this information not be used in cross-examination if 
it involves disclosure or verification of the witness’ true identity?’115
Also, ‘if the dispute is resolved in favour of the accused, the order is 
infringed. If in favour of the State, the accused could be prejudiced 
and the extent of the prejudice difficult, if not impossible, to assess.’116
108 R v Davis supra (n31) at para 59. 
109 S v Nzama & another 1997 (1) SACR 542 (D). 
110 S v Nzama & another supra (n109) at 543D.
111 S v Nzama & another supra (n110) at 543D. 
112 Also see S v Leepile and Others (5) 1986 (4) SA 187 (W) at 191B-D.
113 S v Leepile & Others supra (n112). 
114 S v Leepile & others supra (n112) at 189G-H.
115 S v Leepile & others (n112) at 190D-E.
116 S v Leepile & others (n112) at 190F.
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But in S v Pastoors,117 the court came to a different conclusion. In 
this case s 153(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act,118 and specifically a 
court’s discretion to allow that a witness’s identity not be revealed if 
there is a likelihood that harm may result, was considered. The court 
described the expression, ‘a likelihood that harm may result’ as a rea-
sonable possibility of such harm – a question of fact – to be decided 
on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.119 The applicant 
in the Pastoors case was consequently allowed to testify behind closed 
doors, he was exempted from the duty to disclose his name to the 
court and he was authorised to adopt any pseudonym for the purposes 
of the trial. The court furthermore held that should the accused at 
any stage of the proceedings consider that the witness’s true identity 
is pivotal to their case, then the court will consider an application for 
the witness’s true identity to be revealed.120 And in S v Madlavu & 
others,121 the expression, ‘a likelihood that harm may result’ was given 
an even broader meaning. Here it was suggested that the court is not 
bound to the particular facts of the case but that,
‘…the Court can travel beyond the mere facts of this case and draw upon 
its own judicial experience in other cases of a like nature, and consider the 
nature of the act alleged in the indictment; the atmosphere of the case itself; 
the type of case with which we have to deal; the prevailing circumstances 
as a matter of common knowledge in which the crimes alleged in the indict-
ment were alleged to have been committed and similar considerations.’122
Following a similar line of argument as in the Pastoors and Madlavu 
cases, the different ways in which people respond to and deal with 
crime, as well as the potentially intimidating and traumatic effect that 
the modus operandi of the accusatorial system may have on witnesses 
and victims, therefore necessitates that scope is allowed for appropri-
ate and correct interpretations of a victim’s and/or witness’s need for 
protection immediately after the crime and also during the ensuing 
criminal proceeding in the context of the criminal justice system.123 
And, in some instances, this may require that a court protects the iden-
tity of a victim or witness, by allowing for and warranting the complete 
anonymity of such persons testifying against offenders. And although 
this is a drastic restriction on the right of confrontation, in S v Ndhlovu 
117 S v Pastoors 1986 (4) SA 222 (W). 
118 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
119 S v Pastoors supra (n117) at 224 F; S v Madlavu & Others 1978 (4) SA 218 (E) at 222G. 
120 S v Pastoors supra (n117) at 226F-227A.
121 S v Madlavu & Others supra (n119). 
122 S v Madlavu & Others supra (n119) at 222H – 223A. 
123 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Understanding the South Afri-
can Victim’s Charter – A Conceptual Framework, 2007 (see http://www.justice.gov.za/
VC/docs/2008Understanding%20victims_concept.pdf, accessed on 28 October 2010.
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& Others,124 it was held that the right to confrontation and to challenge 
evidence is not guaranteed but rather subject to limitation in terms of 
s 36 of the Constitution. It was recently also recognised, that to truly 
give effect to victim’s rights and needs specifically, as envisaged in the 
Service Charter for Victims of Crime, a paradigm shift and complete 
overhaul of the South African criminal justice system might be neces-
sary.125 This approach was endorsed by the Canadian Supreme Court 
in Regina v Toten:
‘The public adversarial process is, however, a means to an end – the ascer-
tainment of truth – and has virtue only to the extent that it serves that end. 
Where the established process hinders the search for truth, it should be 
modified unless due process or resource-based considerations preclude such 
modification.’126
This point of view was also endorsed in S v Ntoae & others,127 where 
the state lodged an application that two state witnesses testify behind 
closed doors and that their identity not be revealed to anyone other 
than the court. Navsa J considered the two contradicting judgements 
in S v Pastoors,128 and S v Leepile,129 and held that the Leepile case 
was decided at a time of ‘…cloak and dagger policing and of faceless 
and nameless accusers.’ In the Leepile case Ackermann J was conse-
quently correctly concerned about the accused being denied a fair trial 
should the witness’s identity not be disclosed. Ackermann J was also 
correctly concerned about the dwindling of public confidence in the 
judicial system of that time. Today, however, South Africa is faced with 
a scourge of crime and Navsa J emphasised the intention of s 153(2)
(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act which is to aid the administration of 
justice by ensuring that members of the public, who do their civic duty 
and come forward to do so, can testify without fear of reprisals.130 It 
has, for example, already been allowed by the Constitutional Court that 
documents be withheld from the accused in justifiable circumstanc-
124 S v Ndhlovu & Others 2002 (6) SA 305 (SCA) at paras [17], [18], [22] and [24] at 317G 
– 318E/F, 319H – I and 320F – 321C. 
125 Joint report by the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services, the Portfolio Com-
mittee on Justice and Constitutional Development, and the Portfolio Committee on 
Safety and Security: Review of the Criminal Justice System, 19 February 2009, avail-
able at http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2009/comreports/090302pcjusticereport5.htm, 
accessed on 28 October 2010. 
126 Regina v Toten (1993)16 CRR (2d) 49 Ontario, C.A.; Müller op cit (n61) 23.
127 S v Ntoae & Others 2000 (1) SACR 17 (W) at 18D. 
128 S v Pastoors supra (n117).
129 S v Leepile & others supra (n112), the case of S v Ntoae quotes S v Leepile & Others (1) 
1986 (2) SA 333 (T).
130 S v Ntoae & others (n127) at 30. 
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es.131 While he recognised the need, in exceptional circumstances, for 
the identity of a witness to remain anonymous, he also warned that 
withholding the name of a witness from the court itself could very 
rarely, if ever be justified.132 ‘The public requires to know that in ap-
propriate circumstances, within the confines of the law, witnesses who 
may be of assistance to the Court will be protected.’133
6.  Conclusion
In the face of arguments suggesting that witness anonymity violates 
the accused’s right to a fair trial, it must also be considered that witness 
anonymity may in certain instances be the only measure available to 
ensure a fair trial for all.134 Witnesses are central to crime investiga-
tion and prosecution, and the legal system is depended, in part, on 
the co-operation of the community.135 Thus, individuals whose rights 
had been transgressed ought to believe that they would be protected 
in the justice process when dealing with the person or persons who 
perpetrated the crime.136
Such arguments in favour of witness anonymity is primarily based on 
the contention that the right of confrontation is not absolute, that the 
prejudice to the accused can be minimised, and that witness anonymity 
can be justified in terms of the balancing of the rights of the witness 
against that of the accused, together with the purported balancing of 
the competing interests in the administration of criminal justice.137 
However, it must also be noted that this approach is unfairly balanced 
against the accused from the outset.138 To allow true witness anonym-
ity effectively places an onus on the accused to show that the non-
disclosure of the witness’s identity would be substantially and unduly 
prejudicial.139 In addition, the significance of the particular witness’s 
identity cannot be predicted in advance of actual inquiries from the 
accused, and such inquiries will, in turn, be depended on prior knowl-
edge of the witness’s identity.140
131 Shabalala & others v Attorney-General of the Transvaal & Another 1995 (2) SACR 761 
(CC); 1995 (12) BCLR 1593 (CC); S v Ntoae & Others supra (n127) at 31. 
132 S v Ntoae & Others supra (n127) at 30. 
133 S v Ntoae & Others supra (n127) at 30. 
134 State v Pastoors supra (n117).
135 Bruce op cit (n21) 28; Irish, Magadhla, Qhobosheane, & Newham op cit (n5); Cusick 
op cit (n83).
136 S v Staggie & another supra (n5) 244i – 245b. 
137 Lusty op cit (n32) 423.
138 Lusty op cit (n32) 423.
139 Lusty op cit (n32) 423.
140 Lusty op cit (n32) 423.
Witness anonymity and the South African criminal justice 
system 369
SACJ-2010-3-Text.indd   369 2011/02/14   2:48 PM
‘Requiring an accused to satisfy such an onus as a precondition to disclosure 
of an adverse witness’s true identity would deny a substantial right and with-
draw one of the safeguards essential to a fair trial, effectively emasculating 
the right of cross-examination itself.’141
While the verdict is still out on whether such a drastic curtailment of 
the right of confrontation is justified in terms of an accused’s right to 
a fair trial, the need for the sufficient and effective protection of wit-
nesses remains a serious weakness in the fight against crime.
141 Lusty op cit (n32) 424; Alford v United States 282 US 687 (1931) 691-4; Smith v Illnois 
390 US 129 (1967). 
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